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 With rapid economic growth in recent years, Pakistan’s demand for 
energy has been increasing at the rate of 10-12 percent per annum.  However, 
the country’s rather static oil, hydroelectric power and gas reserves have raised 
serious concerns as to the sustainability of the current economic expansion, as 
well as future economic growth. The gap between Pakistan’s energy use and 
the country’s ability to produce energy has widened in an alarming way in 
recent years (Figure 1) 
 
 As a means of responding to the country’s lagging energy supply, the 
Government has drawn up a 25-year plan (2005-2030) for expanding energy 
production1. Initial cost estimates are staggering -- $ 37 billion to $ 40 billion, 
with an average annual investment of approximately $1.5 billion.  Given the 
country’s low rate of domestic savings, much of this expense will have to be 
met by increased flows of foreign aid, external borrowing, and foreign direct 
investment – all of which can be somewhat problematic. 
 
 Pakistan’s energy plan provides an excellent overview of the challenges 
facing the country over the next several decades, and it provides a sound, 
practical, framework for identifying short-term, as well as medium and longer 
term needs. The emphasis on developing indigenous sources of energy is 
sound, especially in light of the country’s vast coal deposits and hydroelectric 
potential.  On the other hand, one might question several of the key 
assumptions upon which the Plan is based. The Plan assumes high sustained 
                                                 
1 Useful summaries can be found in: Shamim Ahmed Rizvi, “Energy Demand Growing in the 
Face of Static Reserves,” Pakistan & Gulf Economist, April 3, 2006; Secretary, Planning & 
Development Division, “National Energy Needs” Presentation to Pakistan Development Forum, 
April 26, 2005; and Fahd Ali, “Pakistan’s Future Energy Needs,” South Asia Journal, 
July/September 2005. 
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rates of economic growth – above 7.5% will be the norm for the future. This 
pace of economic expansion in turn defines many of the country’s future 
energy requirements and the proper timing for project implementation.  
 
 High sustained growth has not been achieved in the past and, 
unfortunately, it is unlikely likely to be the dominant pattern for the foreseeable 
future.2  Instead, the pattern has been one of roughly a decade of expansion 
followed by a decade of rather flat growth rates3.  Patterns of this type, if they 
continue into the future, will create a somewhat different mix of energy 
requirements than that envisaged in the Energy Plan. Also unclear is the likely 
pattern of future energy prices – how sensitive are the assumed energy supply 
demand balances to alternative energy scenarios? Clearly, these will also have a 
great effect on both the country’s supply of and demand for commercial 
energy.  
 
                                                 
2 See for example Shahid Javed Burki, “Pakistan’s Growth Story,” Dawn, March 28, 2006. 
3 As documented in Robert Looney, “Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism in Pakistan: 
Conceptualizing a Proper Role for U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Asia Survey, XLIV:6 
(November/December 2004), pp. 771-793, and Robert Looney, “Pakistan’s Economy: 
Achievements, Progress, Constraints and Prospects,” in Hafeez Malik, Pakistan: Founders’ 
Aspirations and Today’s Realities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 195-243. 
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 Taking the cyclical nature of Pakistan’s economic performance into 
account, and drawing on recent empirical research examining the complex links 
between energy and the economy, the sections that follow attempt to sketch 
out several alternative scenarios of growth and energy needs.  In particular, 
what are some of the key interrelationships between sources of energy demand 
and supply?  What are the economic growth consequences of alternative 
energy availabilities and in turn how do these growth patterns affect the 
subsequent energy supply and demand patterns? What energy strategies are 
suggested by the interconnection between the country growth requirements 
and energy needs? Are these significantly modified under rising or falling 
energy prices? 
Energy and the Economy—Historical Patterns 
 The cyclical nature of Pakistan’s economic progress is sketched out in 
Table 1.  The 1960s, 1980s and early 2000s have been periods of rapid 
expansion in most of the standard macroeconomic growth indices. In turn 
these have affected, albeit to a lesser extent, the many measures of individual 
energy supply and demand.  Several other patterns are also of particular 
interest for meeting the country’s future energy needs: 
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1. Capital formation has tended to increase at a slower rate than the over-
all economy.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has suggested4 that 
an increase in investment will be necessary if the current economic 
expansion is to be sustained.  The Fund also notes that the increase in 
growth over the past several years may have reflected, in part, a 
reduction in excess capacity as well as favorable weather conditions that 
aided agricultural production – two elements that are unlikely to be 
sustainable in the near term. 
 
2. Domestic oil production has been rather flat in recent years, despite the 
increase in world oil prices – the country may have great difficulties in 
expanding oil production in the future and will need to look to 
alternative energy sources or become increasingly dependent on 
expensive oil imports – an alternative likely to greatly limit future 
economic growth. In this regard overall energy imports have expanded 
rapidly in recent years, although not nearly to the extent of other South 
Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka and India (Figure 2) 
 
3. The other dominant energy pattern is the long-run shift in power 
generation from hydro sources to oil and coal generators (Figure 3). 
Clearly, much of the country’s current energy crisis stems from the 
decline in hydro sources of energy and an over-reliance on increasingly 
expensive sources of electricity.  Oil-fired plants presently account for 68 
per cent of generation capacity, hydroelectric plants for 30 percent and 
nuclear plants for only 2 per cent. This has led one observer to note that: 
                                                 
4 Pakistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 05/408 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, November 2005), p.15 
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Table 1
Pakistan: Historical Economic and Energy Trends
________________________________________________________________________________
Year 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2005
________________________________________________________________________________
Macroeconomic Growth Indicators
GDP 6.79 4.84 6.86 3.98 5.16
Capital Formation 9.82 4.49 5.85 1.93 3.81
Infrastructure 10.35 3.27 5.40 3.01 0.42
Manufacturing 9.75 5.60 8.67 4.29 8.19
Agriculture 4.57 2.66 4.43 4.23 2.83
Industry 10.48 6.59 8.19 4.71 7.15
Services 6.80 6.37 6.77 4.53 5.69
Per-Capita GDP 3.87 1.62 4.02 1.44 2.86
Population 2.80 3.17 2.74 2.50 2.25
Personal ConsumptionPer Capita 2.28 2.14 1.43 2.36 2.77
Investment Per Capita 6.82 1.28 3.03 -0.56 1.51
Structural and Price Patterns
Share of Capital Formation in GDP 30.83 21.61 20.62 18.84 15.13
Share of Manufacturing in GDP 10.24 11.42 13.00 13.87 15.55
Growth in World Oil Price ($ per barrel) 51.52 -2.35 2.04 22.26
Growth in Rupee Oil Price 66.11 5.52 11.74 26.04
Growth in Energy Demand
Oil/Petroleum (tons) 5.06 8.86 6.37 -1.66
Gas (mm cft) 8.55 7.35 4.92 10.66
Electricity (Gwh) 7.86 11.58 4.97 5.99
Coal (metric tons) 1.27 7.13 3.30 12.58
Growth in Energy Supply
Oil: Local Crude Extraction 4.35 19.35 1.92 3.27
Oil: Imports 2.60 0.26 2.23 12.59
Oil: Total (barrels) 2.64 3.88 2.00 9.00
Petroleum Products Imports 20.96 12.18 10.20 -8.72
Petroleum Products Production 2.47 4.39 1.05 10.53
Total Petroleum Products (tons) 5.26 6.99 5.76 -0.40
Gas (mcf) 8.64 7.60 5.08 10.47
Coal Production 1.29 7.61 3.64 5.87
Coal Imports -21.48 39.19 0.75 26.59
Total Coal (tons) 0.90 10.91 2.74 11.09
Electricity Installed Capacity (MW) 9.73 7.57 8.31 3.70
Electricity Generation (Gwh) 9.43 9.37 6.61 4.62
Hydroelectric Installed Capacity (MW) 15.55 6.79 5.81 5.54
Hydroelectric Generation (Gwh) 13.26 7.69 3.17 3.18
Thermal Installed Capacity (MW) 8.04 8.98 10.43 2.69
Thermal Generation (Gwh) 7.44 11.83 9.45 5.05
Nuclear Installed Capacity (MW) 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.54
Nuclear Generation (Gwh) 20.81 730.08 89.15 81.94
________________________________________________________________________________
Data Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 2005-06, and various issues, Government of Pakistan 
Ministry of Finance, 2006; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
various issues; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.
Note: Infrastructure derived from regressing Gross Fixed Capital Formation on Its Lagged Value  
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Figure 2 
Energy Imports in South Asia  
 





































This thermal-to-hydro ratio of 68 per cent to 30 percent is a highly 
skewed mix from a generation-cost point of view and has had a 
huge adverse impact on the economy over the last six or seven years 
as oil prices have risen inexorably, pushing up Pakistan’s electricity 
tariff to one of the highest in the world. This, in turn, has pushed up 
manufacturing costs, fuelled inflation, and made Pakistani goods 
less competitive in export markets, resulting in a growing trade gap 
and increased pressure on the balance of payments.5 
 
4. Another important trend is the rapid increase in the share of electricity 
consumed by households as opposed to industry (Figure 3).  This pattern 
                                                 
5 Kaleem Omar, “Pakistan is Expecting Foreign Exchange Inflows of $35 Billion in the Current 
Fiscal Year,” The News International, October 10, 2005. 
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largely reflects energy pricing and has come under increased criticism by 
most energy experts.6 
Figure 3 
Pakistan: Pattern of Electricity Consumption by User 
 



































5. Less dramatic are a number of long term relationships that have existed 
between the economy and energy supply and demand elements, as well 
as between the various forms of energy consumed and supplied (Table 
2).   
 
 Technically7, these long-term relationships are such that any disturbances 
caused by short-run shocks set off an adjustment process restoring the 
longer run patterns.  In particular, per capita GDP has a stable relationship 
with a number of energy consumption patterns including oil/petroleum, 
                                                 
6 Shahid Javed burki, “A Barrel of Woes,” Dawn, February 11, 2004 
7 They are identified as statistically co-integrated. M. Hashem Pesaran and Behram Pesaran, 
Working With Microfit 4.0: Interactive Econometric Analysis, Camfit Data, Cambridge England, 
1997 for a description of this statistical property and the best means to identify its occurrence.  
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electricity, and coal.  Within these patterns, a series of positive and negative 
impacts occur from changes in other forms of energy.  For example, 
increased use of coal, and gas, negatively impact on oil/petroleum 
consumption.  In addition, expanded thermal electricity capacity has had a 
distinct negative effect on hydro generation (and vice versa), leading at least 
one knowledgeable observer8 to note that perhaps the government’s recent 
attempt to meet the country’s immediate energy needs through thermal 
generation has significantly delayed the more economically viable 
alternative of hydroelectric generation capacity.    
 
Table 2
Pakistan: Long Run Commercial Energy Patterns
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable Per Capita Trade-Off With Error Correction




Total Oil/Petroleum Consumption Yes Electricity, Negative Yes
Yes Coal, Negative Yes
No Gas, Negative Yes
Electricity Yes Gas, Positive Yes
Yes Coal, Positive No
Coal No Gas, Positive No
Supply Interrelationships
Crude Oil Extraction No Coal Production, Positive Yes
Yes Electricity Capacity, Negative Yes
Gas Yes Total Electricity Capacity, Positive No
Hydro Generation No Thermal Electricity Capacity, Negative Yes
Thermal Generation Capacity No Hydro Electricity Capacity, Negative Yes
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Estimations made using ARDL approach to cointegration. Estimation interval, 1973-2005
See M. Hashem Pesaran and Bahram Pesaran, Working With Microfit 4.0
Interactive Econometric Analysis, Camfit Data, Cambridge England, 1997 for a description of the method used.
A statistically significant error correction term suggests the return to a long run equilibrium with the equation
variables following a sudden movement in one of them. The coefficient of this term is suggestive of the speed of
return to equilibrium.
Data Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 2005-06, and various issues, Government of Pakistan 
Ministry of Finance, 2006; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
various issues; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.  
Energy and the Economy—Empirical Studies 
 Statistical studies of the links between energy and the Pakistani economy 
have found a number of important relationships. The main finding is that 
energy use and economic growth are interrelated in that energy expansion 
                                                 
8 Shahid Javed Burki, “Resisting The Past Trend,” Dawn, May 20, 2006. 
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leads to higher growth and, conversely, its shortage may retard the growth 
process. Also, the different types of energy affect growth in varying ways. In 
this regard Siddiqui found the impact of electricity and petroleum products as 
well as that of electricity only is high and statistically significant. However, the 
reverse causality was found critical only in the case of petroleum products. 
 
 Focusing on infrastructure and energy, the dominant pattern is one of 
feedback.  Specifically increases in infrastructure and investment tend to lead to 
an expansion of energy output.  In turn, this expanded output induces further 
increases in investment and infrastructure. The picture is mixed however and 
generalizations difficult9 at the subdivision level. For the period 1972-1990: 
 
1. As might be anticipated, increases in public infrastructure in the 
electricity gas and water sector produced a strong follow on expansion 
of energy production.  On the other hand, public investment in the 
sector produced only a weak expansion in output. 
 
2. Investment and infrastructure in the Indus Basin – an area where one 
might expect a number of complementary relationships with energy 
development – actually experienced a decrease in energy production 
following expanded investment and infrastructure. 
 
3. General government infrastructure and investment (including that by 
federal, provincial and local authorities) was only weakly associated with 
energy production. 
 
4. Federal infrastructure responded fairly strongly to increased levels of 
energy production.  That is, investment by federal authorities did not 
expand energy output.  Instead capital formation by this level of 
government responded to past increases in energy production. 
 
 The general picture that develops is one in which infrastructure 
development may have lagged somewhat behind the needs created by the 
economy – this is consistent with the secular decline in infrastructure noted in 
Table 1.  It is also apparent that infrastructure and public investment have not 
initiated an expansion of the energy sector to the extent that the authorities 
might have hoped.  At best, public investment and infrastructure have 
expanded, but usually only when prompted by increased levels of energy 
production (and presumably the pressures that have been associated with 
power shortages, load shedding, etc.) 
 
                                                 
9 Robert Looney, “Infrastructural Constraints on Energy Development: The Case of Pakistan,” 
The Journal of Energy and Development 16:2 (1992), pp. 267-285. 
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 The above assessment of the interrelationship between pubic investment 
and energy development suggests serious output constraints, largely related to 
insufficient development of domestic resources.  This in turn 
underdevelopment is related to low levels of investment which, during 1972-
1990 had been financed, nearly exclusively by the federal government.  In fact, 
energy-sector investments (mostly WAPDA—Water and Power Development 
Authority) accounted for nearly 50 percent of the public investment program in 
FY 1989 and 45 percent in FY 1990.  The policy implications of these patters 
were clear:10             
 
The large percentage of a small public investment program is both 
insufficient and unsustainable because of conflicting demands from 
other sectors. Therefore in addition to higher domestic resource 
mobilization by the public sector (and by the energy-sector companies), 
increased private sector investment in energy is essential.  
 
 Finally the links between energy and the economy may be strengthening.  
Research11 for the period prior to 1990 cast some doubt on the importance of 
investment in the energy sector in Pakistan as a means of accelerating 
economic growth.  Specifically, there was little evidence that the overall 
economic growth of the country had been stimulated by the expansion in 
energy that took place during the previous decade.  Toward the end of the 
1980s, the situation appears to have changed.  At this time power outages may 
have reduced GDP by up to 1.8 percent12.  By the early 1990s, this fact, 
together a positive linkage from energy to private investment, was sufficient to 
justify accelerating the country’s investment in energy capacity.  That this 
acceleration in investment did not occur in the 1990s and into the 2000s (Table 
3) is clearly one of the major contributing factors to the current energy crisis. 
A Macro-Energy Forecasting Model 
 Drawing on the empirical work noted above, a macro-energy forecasting 
model was constructed. Its main features (Figure 4) are summarized below: 
 
1. Expanded per capita income is assumed to be a function of energy 
availability and capital formation. Statistically, in addition to capital 
formation, gas, coal and hydro-electric generation have the strongest 
statistical links to per capita income. 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 283. 
11 Robert Looney, “Pakistan: Energy Development and Economic Growth in the 1990s,” OPEC 
Review XIX:2 (Summer 1995), pp. 149-167. 
12 Hafiz Pasha, Aisha Ghaus and Salman Malik, “The Economic Cost of Power Outages in the 
industrial Sector of Pakistan,” Energy Economics (1989), pp. 301-318. 
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2. In turn per capita income affects both the demand for total energy as 
well as domestic sources of energy.  
 
Table 3
Pakistan: Investment in Electricity and Gas
(Rs million, constant prices of 1999-2000)
_______________________________________________________________________
Year Total Private Public
________________________________________
1999-00 67354 15169 52185
2000-01 65582 14796 50785
2001-02 52804 32632 20173
2002-03 50119 23001 27118
2003-04 16934 2044 14890
2004-05 25978 4926 21052
2005-06 32628 11339 21290
Average Auunual Growth -11.40% -4.70% -13.90%
_______________________________________________________________________
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, 2005-06
 
3. The world dollar price of oil times the Rupee exchange rate was found to 
be statistically significant in a number of energy supply and demand 
relationships. 
 
4. As noted above, a number of energy demand relationships are 
competitive – expanded use of one type of energy comes at the expense 
of another.  Also, several types of energy expansion discourage output 
increases in others.  Complementarities also exist between different 
types of energy on both the demand and supply side.  
 
5. To capture these effects a Vector Autoregression model was constructed.  
The model was then used to quantify past economic/energy patterns as 
the basis for forecasts to the year 2035.  The interrelationships between 
the various types of energy are captured through the use of lagged 
values (previous years). Specifically, each category of energy, for example 
coal, is estimated based on values of the previous year for other sources 
of energy -- gas, electricity etc in addition to other independent variables 
such as per capita GDP. 
Model Stage I: Energy Availabilities and Future Levels of Per Capita GDP  
 As a first step in forecasting future energy balances, specified levels of 
total energy availability – total gas supply, total coal supply and hydroelectric 
generation (center, Figure 3) together with assumed levels of gross capital 
formation determine the future values of a number of macroeconomic 
variables.  These include: (a) GDP per capita, (b) private consumption per 
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capita, and (c) government consumption per capita.  Investment per capita and 
infrastructure were derived from the assumed pattern of investment.  The 
energy variables were selected based on their statistical significance in affecting 
the macroeconomic variables included in the model. 
Figure 4 









































 Next seven different energy/investment scenarios are considered, each 
based on different assumptions concerning patterns and rates of investment 
and energy availability.  These scenarios are constructed in a manner that 
assures that over-all per capita income increases improve over their historical 
patterns (Table 1). More importantly, energy expansion is not looked at just in 
terms of specific power outputs. Rather, the models attempt to show the likely 
manner in which different investment/energy supply mixes interact with the 
overall economy to produce higher standards of living. 
 
 Model 1:  Base Line Forecast – Consolidated Growth.  In this scenario, 
gross capital formation and the three key energy variables are assumed to 
expand at a rate of 3% per annum.  This forecast is assumed to be the worst 
case scenario – the current growth phase ends, resource constraints and 
perhaps political uncertainties undermine efforts to attract foreign investment 
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and aid.  However, investment or energy availability does not decline as 
dramatically as in the 1970s or 1990s.  Growth largely occurs through 
consolidating and extending various economic and governance reforms. 
 
 Model 2: Continuation of the Historical Pattern of Cyclical Growth.  
The current growth phase extends to 2010 followed by flatter growth up to 
2020 with another expansion and leveling off in the 2020-2030 and 2030-35 
periods. The assumed values for the growth of gross capital formation and the 
energy components for the periods, 2006-2010, 2011-2020, 2021-2030, 2031-
2035 are as follows: gross capital formation, 4%, 2%, 4%, 2%; gas, 10%, 7%, 
10%, 7%; coal, 4%, 11%, 4%, 11%; hydro generation, 6%, 4%, 6%, 4%. 
 
 Model 3: Historical Pattern of Cyclical Growth but With Political 
Opposition Preventing a Major Expansion in New Dam Construction.  In 
this scenario, efforts to over-come regional opposition to new dams fail. As a 
result, hydroelectric generation expansion is limited to 3% per annum.  Other 
variables are assumed to expand as in Model 2. 
 
 Model 4: Government Investment Led Growth, But With Emphasis 
on Social Programs. In this scenario, the country is able to attract and 
mobilize sufficient resources to sustain rates of gross capital formation at 6%.  
However a shift in expenditure priorities allocates a larger share of government 
resources to social investments – education, health, etc., rather than energy.  
The private sector is left to fund added investment in the energy sector. The 
private sector responds with gas and coal expanding at 7% and 5% 
respectively, but hydroelectric generation expanding as the historical pattern 
assumed in Model 2.  
 
  Model 5: Private-Sector-Led Growth.  As in Model 4 the private sector 
mobilizes sufficient resources to expand gas and coal supplies by 7%, and 5% 
per annum over the period to 2035.  However, the public sector, unable to 
pursue adequate tax reform, is constrained to its historical cyclical pattern of 
investment.  As a result gross capital formation and hydro-electric generation 
are assumed to expand as in Model 2. 
 
 Model 6: Expanded Dam Construction and Hydroelectric Capacity. 
Political impediments to new dam construction are overcome; the World Bank 
and other donors supply adequate funds for a major expansion in the country’s 
hydroelectric generation capacity.  Gross capital formation increases at 6% per 
annum with hydroelectric generation expanding as follows: 2006-10, 5%, 
2011-20, 7%, 2021-20, 9%, 2030-35, 11%.  The vast expansion in hydroelectric 
capacity lessens the perceived profitability of investment in coal and gas 
development.  Total supplies of these energy sources are assumed to expand at 
rates of 3% per annum over the period to 2035. 
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 Model 7: Coal/Gas Led Energy Expansion.  For some of the reasons 
noted above, hydroelectric expansion is constrained and overall investment 
levels follow the historical cyclical patterns.  Concerns over energy shortages, 
however, lead to the creation of a number of incentives for investment in coal 
and to a lesser extent gas.  Total supplies of these two energy sources are 
assumed to expand at rates of 7% per annum during the forecasting period.  
 
 Each of the models produces a distinctive pattern of per capita income 
expansion over the period to 2035. All are improvements over the base line 
forecast. Several results (Table 3) are of particular interest: 
 
1. As might be expected, maximum growth occurs in later periods under 
the major expansion in hydro capacity (Model 6). 
 
2. The limited development of domestic coal (Model 5) seems to provide 
the least satisfactory of the highly viable strategies. Growth rates under 
this strategy lag considerably behind the historical/cyclical scenario 
(Model 2). 
 
3. The historical cyclical pattern (Model 2) has the quickest pay-off, but its 
boom and bust nature may make for lower rates of investment in certain 
types of domestic energy.  Based on the workings of the macro-energy 
model, lower rates of investment would have their greatest impact on 
domestic supplies of thermal electricity generation. 
 
4. A strategy emphasizing coal and gas (Model 7) produces quicker gains in 
income than the hydro strategy, but after 2010 the hydro strategy 
results in more rapid gains in per capita income. 
 
5. High sustained growth can occur without a major expansion in energy 
(Model 4). However with changing and unforeseen future technologies 
this may be a risky alternative exposing the country to world energy 
price fluctuations and interruption of supplies.   
 
 The results should be taken with a note of caution – they are simply 
suggestive of certain patterns on the assumption many historical relationships 
continue to prevail.  Clearly unforeseen shocks during the forecast period 
would modify, perhaps significantly, the rates of per capita income growth 
reported below. Another factor to consider is the actual feasibility of a 
particular model.  Clearly Model 1 is more feasible than Models 4 or 6, which 
rely on sustained levels of investment well over those experienced in the past.  
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 Finally, as the models’ relationships weaken due to future policy changes 
such as price deregulation, the relationships will be further modified.  Looked 
at from this perspective the models’ forecast of future consumption patterns 
balanced against likely expansion of domestic energy sources provides a 
framework for examining various policy options. 
 
Table 3
Pakistan: Growth in Per Capita GDP Under Different Energy Strategies
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Average Annual Growth 2005-2009 2010-2019 2020-2029 2030-2035
__________________________________________________________________________________________
1. Base Line 3.34 2.09 2.34 2.44
2. Historical Cyclical Pattern 6.11 3.84 6.67 4.90
3. Historical Cyclical -- Lagging Hydro 5.53 3.39 6.16 4.56
4. Investment Led Growth -- Energy Lag 5.03 4.08 5.00 5.09
5. Normal Investment/Hydro -- Low Coal, G 4.93 3.66 4.85 4.70
6. High Investment/Hydro Strategy 4.05 3.85 5.56 7.37
7. Moderate Emphasis on Coal and Gas 4.56 3.54 4.54 4.79
8. High Emphasis on Coal and Gas 5.51 5.28 7.27 8.27
9. Maximum Growth 6.00 6.55 8.35 9.49
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Simulations based on Vector Autoregression model of order 2. Dependent variables: (1) per capita GDP,
(2) per capita private consumptions, (3) per capita government consumption. Independent  variables:  
(1) gross fixed capital formation, (2) total gas supply, (3) total coal supply and (4) hydroelectric generation.  
All economic variables are in constant prices of year 2000. Estimation interval, 1973-2005.
See M. Hashem Pesaran and Bahram Pesaran, Working With Microfit 4.0 Interactive Econometric Analysis
Camfit Data, Camabridge England, 1997 for a description of the method used.
Simulation Assumptions:
Model 1: Investment and Energy Expand at 3% per annum
Model 2: For Periods, 2006-2010, 2011-2020, 2021-2030, 2031-2035: Investment, 4%, 2%, 4%, 2%;
                Gas, 10%, 7%, 10%, 7%; Coal, 4%, 11%, 4%, 11%; Hydro, 6%, 4%, 6%, 4%.
Model 3. Model 2 Pattern of Investment, Coal and Gas, but Hydroelectric Generation Held to 3% per annum
Model 4. Investment, 6%, Gas, 7%, Coal 5%, Hydro, as in Model 2.
Model 5: Gas, 7%, Coal 5%, Investment and Hydro as in Model 2.
Model 6: Investment, 6%, Gas, 3%, Coal, 3%, Hydro, 2006-10, 5%, 2011-20, 7%, 2021-20, 9%, 2030-35, 11%
Model 7: Investment, as in Model 2, Gas, 7%, Coal, 7%, Hydro, 3%
Model 8: Investment as in Model 2, Gas, 10%, Coal 11%, Hydro, 3%
Model 9: Investment, 6%, Gas, 10%, Coal 11%, Hydro as in Model 6.
Data Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 2005-06, and various issues, Government of Pakistan 
Ministry of Finance, 2006; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
various issues; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.  
Model Stage 2: Future Patterns of Energy Consumption  
 Future patterns of energy consumption associated with each of the 
models summarized above are derived from another Vector Auto regression 
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model using as key inputs the output from the first stage of the Macro-Energy 
model – primarily GDP per capita and personal consumption per capita.  In 
addition another variable reflecting broad world oil price movements is 
introduced. Despite the fact that world oil price movements are not translated 
directly into the domestic prices for various types of energy, several highly 
statistically significant relationships were found13.   In particular gas and coal 
consumption in Pakistan has increased fairly markedly with increases in the 
world price of oil. Electricity has been less affected by oil prices, and 
consumption of oil/petroleum products does not appear to be influenced by 
world oil prices. 
 
 The Vector Autoregeression model was specified so that in addition to 
per capita GDP, per capita consumption and oil prices, consumption of the 
main energy components is a function of the past consumption of the other 
main sources of fuel.  This specification facilitates the identification of possible 
energy demand tradeoffs – the substitution of one type of energy by another.  
Here, several patterns were found to stand out14 (Table 4):  
 
1. If a goal of Pakistan’s energy policy is that to reduce dependence on oil 
and petroleum, then expanded gas consumption is one possible 
strategy, although this relationship appeared relatively weak in the 
Macro-Energy Model. 
 
2. On the other hand both oil/petroleum and particularly coal consumption 
appear to come at the expense of gas consumption.  
 
3. Other fuels do not appear to compete with electricity, while expanded 
consumption of oil/petroleum has sharply reduced coal consumption. 
 
 
                                                 
13 As noted earlier the oil price proxy is the average world oil price (IMF data) multiplied by the 
Rupee dollar exchange rate. 
14 The Vector Autoregression resultes are short run impacts – in this case last year’s energy 
consumption of various types on each of the main areas of consumption.  As such, the trade-
offs are not comparable with the longer term patterns noted in Table 2. 
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Table 4
Pakistan: Energy Trade-Offs and Complementarities
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Energy Consumption Oil/ Gas Electricity Coal
Petroleum
Gas (-) Oil/Petroleum (-) None Oil/Petroleum (-, Strong)
Coal (-, strong)
Domestic Production Petroleum Gas Thermal Coal
Products Electricity





Model Stage 3: Future Patterns of Domestic Energy Production  
 As with energy demand, future patterns of domestic energy production 
associated with Models 1-7 were identified with a third Vector Autoregression 
model using the output from the first stage of the Macro-Energy model.  To 
capture supply side constraints as opposed to the previous demand oriented 
assessment, infrastructure was substituted for per capita consumption as an 
independent variable along with per capita GDP and world oil prices. In the 
case of supply, increased oil prices provided a strong stimulus to increased gas 
production as well as thermal electricity. Infrastructure constraints were mainly 
associated with thermal electricity. 
 
 The main energy supply tradeoffs identified by the Vector 
Autoregression model showed (Table 4) petroleum products to be adversely 
affected by expanded thermal electricity.  Somewhat surprisingly, thermal 
electricity also had a weak adverse effect on coal production – no doubt the 
result of the substitution of oil for coal in generating electricity. Increased 
production of coal on the other hand was strongly associated with higher levels 
of thermal electricity.  
Model Stage 4: Future Energy Demand Supply Balances  
 The results of the forecasts of energy demand and domestic supplies 
produced in stages 3 and 4 yielded some interesting patterns.  Two sets of 
forecasts were made: (1) the first under the assumption of gradually falling oil 
prices – the world oil price, converted to rupees, declining at an average rate of 
3% per annum over the forecast period and (2) the second in an environment 
of gradually rising oil prices – 3% per annum.  
 
 The results of the first set of supply demand balances are summarized in 
Table 5, while the results for the second set are reported in Table 6.   
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 It should be noted that the supply demand balances by type of energy 
are not strictly comparable due to the manner in which the first stage model 
was constructed.  The first stage model was primarily interested in examining 
the effects of energy availability, especially hydro electricity on economic 
growth.  The macro economic variables used in the supply and demand 
forecasts--per capita GDP, per capita private consumption, and investment per 




 The supply forecasts presented in Tables 5 and 6 are for the expansion in 
thermal capacity. No assumptions were made concerning nuclear generation of 
electricity. Total domestic generation of electricity would, therefore, be the 
assumed levels of hydro generation plus that generated from the forecasted 
thermal capacity and whatever nuclear power might be made available in the 
future.  Since hydro electricity currently comprises approximately 30% of total 
electricity even at fast rates of expansion, it will be some time before this 
source of electricity makes a significant contribution to the country’s overall 
electricity supply.  Hence the thermal energy forecasts are suggestive, albeit 
very roughly, of the likely supply situation.           
 
 A second factor to keep in mind in interpreting the future energy supply 
and demand balances presented in Table 6 is that the supply of energy does 
not include domestic oil extraction.  Domestic oil extraction was not correlated 
with any of the variables in the Vector Autoregression energy supply model.  
Specifically, production of this energy source does not appear to be greatly 
affected by per capita GDP, infrastructure or oil prices.  Nor is oil extraction 
influenced by the production levels of other energy variables.  In addition there 
are great uncertainties as to the amount of reserves the country will be able to 
develop in the future – past rates of extraction no doubt provide little insights 
as to future rates of production.  The prospects are not bright for major 
discoveries, although some off-shore areas show some promise.  In short there 
is little basis on which to project this source of energy.  
 
 A related issue concerns the breakdown by energy sub-category in the 
available data.  The Pakistan Economic Survey publishes data on the supply of 
petroleum products but no separate figure for the demand for this category of 
energy.  Comparisons of demand (oil/petroleum) and supply (petroleum 
products) provide only the roughest picture for this category of energy. 
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Table: 5
Pakistan: Energy Demand-Supply Balance--Gradually Falling Oil Prices
(average annual rates of growth)
___________________________________________________________________________________
Demand for Energy Domestic Production
2006- 2010- 2020- 2030 2006- 2010- 2020- 2030
__________________ 2009 2019 2029 2035 2009 2019 2029 2035
Model 1
Oil/Petroleum 7.01 2.73 0.60 0.90 Petroleum Products -2.35 2.89 1.19 2.18
Gas 3.10 1.18 1.34 1.72 Gas 2.48 0.76 0.83 1.73
Electricity 5.46 2.30 1.93 2.18 Thermal Electricity 7.16 0.85 2.13 1.82
Coal 2.00 2.23 3.48 3.37 Coal 5.88 2.18 2.65 2.81
Model 2 Model 2
Oil/Petroleum 4.99 2.36 -5.37 4.63 Petroleum Products -0.59 2.93 2.77 2.85
Gas 4.87 2.58 5.06 4.00 Gas 2.99 1.01 2.01 2.57
Electricity 6.62 3.46 4.50 4.20 Thermal Electricity 5.92 1.31 1.21 5.30
Coal 6.08 4.97 8.56 5.03 Coal 9.70 4.38 7.68 4.89
Model 3 Model 3
Oil/Petroleum 4.04 2.93 -7.79 7.30 Petroleum Products -1.03 3.06 2.47 3.46
Gas 4.85 1.98 4.77 3.13 Gas 2.92 1.01 1.89 2.60
Electricity 6.48 2.84 3.91 3.09 Thermal Electricity 6.31 1.26 1.72 4.68
Coal 5.92 3.95 8.53 4.05 Coal 8.89 3.83 7.19 4.62
Model 4 Model 4
Oil/Petroleum 6.94 5.63 3.52 4.40 Petroleum Products -1.36 4.26 4.11 4.83
Gas 3.95 2.30 3.89 4.38 Gas 2.94 2.42 3.68 4.81
Electricity 6.26 4.08 4.47 5.05 Thermal Electricity 6.81 3.90 4.66 5.81
Coal 3.85 3.76 5.89 5.94 Coal 8.18 4.33 5.57 5.32
Model 5 Model 5
Oil/Petroleum 6.49 1.96 -0.43 0.22 Petroleum Products -1.43 3.27 1.97 4.10
Gas 4.01 2.48 3.44 4.08 Gas 2.84 1.06 1.72 2.92
Electricity 6.17 3.36 3.61 4.12 Thermal Electricity 6.70 0.90 3.02 2.49
Coal 3.99 4.97 6.24 5.63 Coal 8.04 4.22 5.56 5.00
Model 6 Model 6
Oil/Petroleum 8.19 4.94 2.57 0.51 Petroleum Products -2.03 4.58 4.17 5.95
Gas 3.20 2.28 4.49 7.05 Gas 2.81 2.47 3.68 5.17
Electricity 5.85 4.10 5.37 7.00 Thermal Electricity 7.45 3.59 4.57 4.50
Coal 2.02 3.80 7.80 10.13 Coal 6.76 4.09 6.31 8.31
Model 7 Model 7
Oil/Petroleum 5.24 2.19 -2.61 -2.18 Petroleum Products -1.67 3.42 1.75 4.62
Gas 4.17 2.14 3.34 3.85 Gas 2.80 1.08 1.64 3.09
Electricity 6.13 2.93 3.14 3.49 Thermal Electricity 6.90 0.77 3.38 1.72
Coal 4.29 4.46 6.28 5.60 Coal 7.58 4.09 5.18 5.36
___________________________________________________________________________________
 
 Model 1: At low rates of economic growth and falling oil prices, gas 
supplies would run well below demand in the years up to 2030.  Electricity 
supplies would be short of anticipated need between 2010 and 2020 and 
perhaps again after 2030. Considerable amounts of coal are currently 
imported, but these would likely decline in the early years.  Coal shortfalls 
might appear after 2010, becoming particularly severe in the 2020s. The gap 
between the demand for oil/petroleum and the supply of petroleum products 
would be particularly severe the early years -- up to 2010.  However after 2010 
supply and demand come more into balance.   
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Table 6
Pakistan: Energy Demand-Supply Balance--Gradually Increasing Oil Prices
(average annual rates of growth)
___________________________________________________________________________________
Demand for Energy Domestic Production
2006- 2010- 2020- 2030 2006- 2010- 2020- 2030
_______________2009 2019 2029 2035 2009 2019 2029 2035
Model 1
Oil/Petroleum 8.84 4.56 2.78 2.73 Petroleum Products -2.61 4.78 2.20 2.97
Gas 4.75 3.42 3.06 2.97 Gas 4.84 3.68 2.91 3.12
Electricity 6.31 3.84 3.19 3.06 Thermal Electricity 10.46 3.68 3.51 2.93
Coal 2.10 2.23 3.26 3.22 Coal 5.93 2.26 2.85 2.90
Model 2 Model 2
Oil/Petroleum 6.83 4.46 -0.24 5.14 Petroleum Products -0.84 4.69 3.41 3.37
Gas 6.36 4.43 5.54 4.25 Gas 5.32 3.81 3.55 3.46
Electricity 7.39 4.78 5.10 4.43 Thermal Electricity 9.33 4.10 2.97 4.91
Coal 6.25 4.92 8.44 4.97 Coal 9.75 4.44 7.74 4.90
Model 3 Model 3
Oil/Petroleum 5.93 4.97 -1.38 6.14 Petroleum Products -1.28 4.84 3.16 3.85
Gas 6.33 3.95 5.35 3.63 Gas 5.25 3.82 3.48 3.49
Electricity 7.25 4.25 4.66 3.60 Thermal Electricity 9.68 4.04 3.25 4.56
Coal 6.09 3.89 8.40 3.98 Coal 8.93 3.88 7.26 4.63
Model 4 Model 4
Oil/Petroleum 8.69 6.99 4.55 4.70 Petroleum Products -1.63 5.91 4.46 4.91
Gas 5.47 4.26 4.70 4.56 Gas 5.27 4.84 4.51 4.78
Electricity 7.03 5.33 5.05 5.11 Thermal Electricity 10.16 5.89 5.00 5.40
Coal 4.04 3.70 5.71 5.87 Coal 8.23 4.39 5.66 5.32
Model 5 Model 5
Oil/Petroleum 8.26 4.05 2.37 2.67 Petroleum Products -1.69 5.05 2.76 4.36
Gas 5.53 4.40 4.36 4.35 Gas 5.18 3.86 3.38 3.68
Electricity 6.94 4.71 4.39 4.40 Thermal Electricity 10.04 3.76 4.05 3.26
Coal 4.18 4.91 6.09 5.57 Coal 8.09 4.28 5.65 5.01
Model 6 Model 6
Oil/Petroleum 9.88 6.36 3.86 2.03 Petroleum Products -2.30 6.24 4.51 5.85
Gas 4.76 4.29 5.16 6.51 Gas 5.15 4.89 4.51 5.02
Electricity 6.63 5.37 5.80 6.73 Thermal Electricity 10.75 5.62 4.94 4.47
Coal 2.22 3.74 7.64 10.13 Coal 6.82 4.15 6.40 8.27
Model 7 Model 7
Oil/Petroleum 8.55 4.24 2.90 2.04 Petroleum Products -1.93 5.19 2.58 4.77
Gas 5.32 4.30 4.06 4.52 Gas 5.14 3.88 3.33 3.78
Electricity 6.86 4.42 4.03 4.08 Thermal Electricity 10.23 3.65 4.28 2.79




 With rising oil prices the situation changes dramatically.  Gas supplies 
are roughly in line with demand throughout the forecast period. Coal supplies 
improve dramatically in the period up to 2010 and might not encounter 
shortfalls until the 2020s.  Also, a big jump in thermal electricity generation 
relieves pressures in the electricity markets throughout the forecast period.  The 
oil/petroleum and petroleum products segment of the energy market follows 
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essentially the same patterns experienced with falling oil prices – severe 
shortfalls in the period up to 2010 followed by a rough balance throughout the 
rest of the forecast period. 
 
 Model 2:  A continuation of the country’s pattern of cyclical economic 
growth during a prolonged period of falling oil prices produces a sharply 
contrasting picture. Domestic gas production lags considerably behind demand 
throughout the forecast period up to 2030. Electricity supplies might be 
adequate up to 2010, but would experience a severe shortfall up to 2020, 
remaining in rough balance for the rest of the forecast period. Coal supplies are 
also adequate up to 2010, but might experience shortfalls after that date.  As 
with Model 1 the gap between oil/petroleum and petroleum products is severe 
in the early years, but not after 2010. 
 
 
 With rising oil prices, domestic gas supplies improve dramatically.  
However, the demand for gas also increases somewhat.  The net result is a 
shortfall throughout the entire forecasting period, with the shortfalls becoming 
particularly severe in the 2020s on in to the early 2030s. Electricity supplies also 
expand, but not enough to stave off severe shortfalls in the 2020s. In contrast, 
coal follows a pattern similar to what might be expected in a period of falling 
prices – initial surpluses, followed by a long period of rough supply demand 
balance, with perhaps demand slightly outrunning supply.  Oil/petroleum and 
petroleum products fluctuate between severe shortages in the initial years, 
balance up to 2020 followed by surpluses in the 2020s and deficits in the early 
2030s. 
 
 Model 3:  In an era of falling energy prices and with hydroelectricity held 
at low levels of expansion, electricity experiences shortfalls up to 2030, with the 
gap between demand and supply especially severe in the 2020s. Domestic gas 
supplies are also inadequate throughout the forecast period.  The pattern is 
one of moderate shortfalls up to 2010 gradually worsening up to 2030. In 
contrast, coal might not experience a shortfall with regard to demand until the 
2020s with supply outrunning demand again in the early 2030s. Oil/petroleum 
and petroleum products are again in deficit in the early years, roughly in 
balance up to 2020 with large surpluses in the 2020s. Deficits however return 
in the early 2030s.  
 
 With rising oil prices, thermal electricity expands sufficiently to meet 
domestic demand. However, a shortfall is likely in the 2030s with demand 
again surpassing supply.  Coal production expands faster than demand in the 
early years significantly reducing imports. After 2010 supply and demand are in 
rough balance.  Although gas production again increases with rising oil prices 
production increases lag behind expanded demand throughout the period up 
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to 2035.  The gap between demand and supply becomes particularly large in 
the 2020s.  Oil/petroleum and petroleum products continue their fluctuating 
pattern of alternating deficits and surpluses beginning with large deficits in the 
period up to 2010. 
 
 Model 4: High rates of overall national investment produce another 
unique pattern of energy balances.  With falling oil prices the gaps between 
demand and supply are generally lower than in the two previous models.  After 
an initial period of early shortfalls, gas production expands to meet demand 
over the remainder of the forecast period. In addition, over the whole forecast 
period electricity supplies also expand at a slightly faster rate than demand.  
The same is true for coal, with the exception of a slight supply shortfall in the 
early 2030s.  Even the fluctuations in oil/petroleum petroleum products are 
dampened, especially after an initial period of sharp shortfalls. 
 
 Rising oil prices do not fundamentally alter this picture.  Instead in most 
cases supply improves slightly relative to demand to further relieve pressures in 
the energy markets. 
 
 Model 5 is characterized by a limited availability of coal, together with a 
cyclical pattern of investment similar to that experience in the past. If oil prices 
experience a gradual decline, energy supply and demand balances are not 
particularly favorable. A sizeable gas shortfall occurs in the early years to 2010, 
increasing somewhat in the years to 2020 and then continuing to 2035.  After 
an initial period of coal production expanding faster than demand, it also 
experiences shortfalls to the end of the projection period. These may not 
however be as significant as those associated with gas. After an initial surplus, 
terminal electricity expansion lags behind expected need, although this may be 
largely made up with the anticipated expansion from hydro sources. After an 
initial deficit, only oil/petroleum petroleum products experience sustained 
periods of domestic supply exceeding demand.  
 
 While model 5 produces a very favorable set of energy balances for 
falling oil prices, the shifts in demand toward gas, coal and electricity with 
rising oil prices erode much of this potential gain.  Gas demand consistently 
outruns supply as is also the case for coal after 2010.  Electricity follows the 
same path as coal, but again expanded hydroelectric sources assumed in stage 
1 of the Macro energy model, 6% for 2006-2010, 4% for 2011-2020, 6% for 
2021-2030, and 4% for 2030-35 may be sufficient to accommodate expanded 
demand.  The Oil/petroleum and petroleum products balance is also not as 
favorable as in the case of falling oil prices. Still, after an initial deficit 
experienced in other models, supply matches demand fairly closely until 2030 
when it accelerates more rapidly. 
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 Model 6 focuses on expanded hydro sources of electricity together with 
high overall rates of sustained investment.  As noted in the discussion of the 
Macro Energy model, this combination results in a sustained acceleration of per 
capita GDP after 2010.  The resulting increase in demand for other energy 
resources together with a stimulus to expand other sources of energy produces 
a unique pattern of energy balances.  After an initial shortfall of supply, the 
oil/petroleum – petroleum products balance is nearly equalized in the period up 
to 2020.  Gas on the other hand, experiences chronic shortfalls of supply 
especially in the 2020s.  Supplies of electricity should be adequate, especially in 
light of the acceleration in hydro sources.  Still thermal capacity is projected to 
lag somewhat behind overall electricity demand after 2010. Domestic coal 
expansion also fails to meet the expanded demand after 2010.  
 
 As in the earlier models, rising oil prices assist in bringing demand and 
supply increases more into balance.  This is especially the case for gas and coal 
in the period up to 2020, although after that date demand significantly 
outruns supply. 
 
 Model 7 assumes fairly abundant supplies of gas and coal, with 
investment less dynamic than in the previous model. This produces, except for 
the base line model, average rates of economic growth somewhat below most 
of the other models. As noted earlier, it produces higher rates of growth than 
the hydro strategy in the earlier years, but this growth flattens out in the latter 
years, falling considerably below that associated with a major expansion in dam 
construction. With falling world oil prices, this mix produces growth in 
domestic gas supplies lagging behind demand, especially in the 2020s. After 
expanding fairly rapidly in the early years, the expansion in domestic coal 
production also fails to keep pace with demand after 2010. In contrast, thermal 
electricity keeps up with demand in the early years only to fall sharply behind 
over the period 2010-2020.  After that demand and supply are fairly balanced 
until shortfalls occur again after 2030.  Oil/petroleum – petroleum products 
reverts to its normal pattern of supply lagging behind demand in alternating 
decades. 
 
 Rising oil prices produce bring coal supply and demand growth largely 
into equality after 2010.  The same is not true of gas however where shortfalls 
continue after 2010.  Electricity also fails to keep pace with demand after 2010.  
Implications 
 In summing up, which alternatives appear to be the best?  While the 
government has limited control over the manner in which Pakistan’s energy 
picture will unfold, several generalizations from the models examined above 
may provide some guidance. 
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 If the goal is to improve energy balances, especially for coal, electricity, 
and gas, then high oil prices that encourage increased production are more 
conducive than declining prices.  With the good chance of growth accelerating 
in Models 4, 6, and 7 after 2010, there is a possibility for the establishment of a 
virtuous circle (Figure 5) where expanded demand for coal, electricity, and gas 
increase profitability in these sectors, thus stimulating expanded investment 
and further growth. 
 
  While the government has little control over international prices, it does 
control the Rupee exchange rate.  In this regard, it should not postpone 
devaluations, but allow the currency to transmit world oil price increases into 
the domestic market.  In the future, the authorities should strive to toward an 

















































 If high sustained growth is sought, then an environment characterized 
by high rates of sustained investment together with hydro development (Model 
6) may be the best course, especially if substantial loans from international 
agencies are forthcoming.  This environment may be the most conducive to a 
virtuous circle. 
 
 Higher rates of GDP growth have other benefits. Ironically lower rates of 
economic growth may be more plagued by energy imbalances than higher 
rates of growth. In the future, low rates of growth may compound this 
problem by making the country less competitive in attracting significant inflows 
of direct foreign investment.  
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 If world oil prices fall for a prolonged period of time, the country should 
definitely pursue a high investment/growth policy such as outlined in Model 4, 
6 or 7. With falling profitability in oil, gas, and coal development and the 
limited prospects for expansion in oil, private investment might not be 
sufficient to maintain high rates of sustained economic growth. The energy 
imbalances experienced at low rates of economic expansion would put stress 
on the country’s balance of payments further discouraging capital inflows to 
the country. In short, the high energy imbalances associated with low growth 
in an atmosphere of falling energy prices is conducive to the creation of a 



























































 This paper is intended to be only an exploratory analysis of Pakistan’s 
energy futures.  As such the forecasting model developed here provides only a 
rough order of magnitudes, and should be looked at as a very preliminary 
approximation of Pakistan’s energy needs.  Its strength is in identifying areas of 
potential trouble and in the need for corrective policy responses.  
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 On the other hand, the Macro Energy Model has a number of inherent 
weaknesses that need to be resolved before a high degree of certainly can be 
attached to its images of the future.  In particular, there are a number of 
inherent contradictions that need to be resolved, such as the inconsistencies 
that exist between the initial rates of growth of energy availabilities and the 
subsequent demand for that type of energy at later stages of the model. 
 
 The model also implicitly assumes that a major goal of energy policy is to 
become less dependent on imported petroleum and petroleum products.  
Other objectives should be examined and their feasibility assessed. 
 
 While the model suggests of certain policy actions, the impact of these 
measures is difficult to predict in any systematic way. 
 
 Finally, without a more extensive macroeconomic framework, it is 
difficult to assess the feasibility of sustained levels of energy imports to bridge 
the gap between demand and domestic supply.  Under certain balance of 
payments situations these shortfalls could be easily financed, while under 
others the same shortfalls would create a severe stress on the economy.  Much 
depends on the availability of foreign direct investment and the extent to 
which these funds could be directed toward expanding domestic energy 
sources. 
 
 This final point leads to the general conclusion that what takes place 
outside the energy sector may have consequences that are just as important for 
the country’s energy picture as policies and events directly affecting the sector.  
 
